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Are There Lewis Conventions?* 
 
Francesco Guala 





David Lewis famously proposed to model conventions as solutions to coordination 
games, where equilibrium selection is driven by precedence, or the history of play. 
A characteristic feature of Lewis Conventions is that they are intrinsically non-
normative. Some philosophers have argued that for this reason they miss a crucial 
aspect of our folk notion of convention. It is doubtful however that Lewis was 
merely analysing a folk concept. I illustrate how his theory can (and must) be 
assessed using empirical data, and argue that it does indeed miss some important 
aspects of real-world conventions. I conclude that whether Lewis Conventions exist 
or not depends on how closely they approximate real-world behaviour, and whether 
we have any alternative theory that does a better job at explaining the phenomena. 
 
 
You are sitting in front of a computer screen. Using your mouse, you can choose one of 
two coloured buttons labelled, from left to right, “Red” and “Blue”. You know that two 
other players are facing the same decision. If you all choose the same colour, you will 
earn 10 experimental tokens each, which will be converted later into real money. 
Unfortunately you have to make your decision simultaneously, without the possibility of 
communicating with the other group members. You also know that you will play this 
game ten times with the same partners, and will receive feedback after each round. What 
will you choose? 
 
It seems that in the first round you cannot do better than choosing at random. But in fact, 
unbeknown to you, your body is already helping you out. Like most people, when the 
screen appeared in front of you, you probably fixated your sight on the button placed on 
the left-hand side of the screen. You then shifted your sight to the right-hand button, 
returned to the left, and repeated this process several times. Eventually, there is a higher 
probability that you will choose the object upon which you fixated first (see Rangel 
2007). 
 
So with a bit of luck all the players in your group will choose Red and earn 10 tokens 
already in the first round. But even if this does not happen, two players out of three will 
necessarily choose the same colour. This will send a message to the third player. Using a 
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simple majority rule, she will infer that choosing that colour is the most likely 
coordination strategy in the next round. Following this reasoning, your group should be 
able to coordinate in just a few rounds, and from then on rather effortlessly make money 
by simply repeating the choice made in the previous round. 
 
At this point a convention has emerged. David Lewis (1969) first proposed to model 
conventions as solutions to repeated coordination problems of this kind. We can represent 
a simple coordination game using a standard two-by-two matrix (Table 1). You are the 
row player and for simplicity the other two members of the group are jointly represented 
as column. This game has two Nash equilibria: Red/Red and Blue/Blue. Standard game 
theory assigns an equal chance for Red and Blue to become coordination points in 
repeated play. Even worse, it is unable to predict that all players will keep playing the 
convention, once they have coordinated. But as a matter of fact, when this game is played 
in the laboratory two-thirds of the participants play Red in the first round, which is then 
twice as likely as Blue to evolve into a convention.1 And of course the overwhelming 
majority continue to coordinate successfully after this has been done at least once. 
 
 Red Blue 
Red 10, 10 0, 0 
Blue 0, 0 10, 10 
 
Table 1: A simple coordination task 
 
Lewis borrowed the idea of modelling conventions as coordination games from Thomas 
Schelling (1962). Schelling had argued that in solving coordination problems we are 
often helped by apparently irrelevant factors that make one of the available strategies 
salient. Consider for example the “Ten Numbers” game: you must choose one among the 
following numbers: 
 
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
 
Your partner is sitting in a separate room and is facing the same problem. It is a one-shot 
game: if you both choose the same number, you will gain $10 each, otherwise nought. In 
a game like this, the probability of converging on the same option by playing randomly is 
very small. Yet, a surprisingly high number of people coordinate successfully by 
choosing zero. There are a number of factors that contribute to make zero salient: it is the 
first number in the list, and it is notoriously a peculiar number too. It is also the first one 
on the left, and as we have seen it is more likely to be chosen for purely physiological 
reasons. 
 
A salient strategy constitutes a focal point that facilitates coordination when purely 
rational considerations are insufficient to pin down the best strategy. Focal points may be 
determined by cultural, cognitive, or even biological factors. Lewis argued that in the 
case of conventions salience is determined by precedence. Why do Britons drive on the 
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left? Forget the traffic code or the police: except a few fools, nobody drives on the left for 
fear of sanctions; we do it because we do not want to crash into one another. If everybody 
else were to swap from left to right, we would do the same, regardless of the law. In 
Britain we drive on the left because every driver has been doing it in recent history, and 
we expect them to continue to do so in the future.  
 
Lewis’ account was remarkable for a number of reasons. It pioneered the application of 
game theoretic tools in the field of social ontology. It introduced the concept of common 
knowledge, and highlighted the importance of repeated play – an insight that has recently 
been vindicated by the development of evolutionary game theory. Finally, it exposed the 
limitations of “pure” rational choice theory for the analysis of collective behaviour. If we 
want to understand how institutions emerge from individual interaction, we must study 
the ways in which cognitive, cultural, and biological biases constrain our behaviour, 
make it more predictable, and hence reduce the enormous complexity of social 
interaction. To constantly engage in the calculations of a perfectly rational player would 
be too time consuming, perhaps impossible for cognitively limited creatures as we are. 
Thus the a priori project of modelling perfectly rational players can only take us so far in 
the study of social behaviour. The study of conventions is inevitably an empirical, as well 
as a theoretical task. 
 
Conventions and norms 
In one important respect Lewis’ theory sits firmly in the rational choice tradition. Our 
main motivation to follow a convention is strictly selfish: we drive on the left because we 
want to avoid accidents; we say “cat” rather than “tac” because we want to be understood 
by our interlocutors; we wear black at funerals because we want to communicate our 
grief. Lewis’ approach then leads naturally to a neat separation between social norms and 
conventions. A social norm always comes with an intrinsic “ought”, and is usually 
backed up by a system of sanctions. The sanctions are meant to change the payoffs of the 
game: for example, to change a mixed-motives game (like a prisoner’s dilemma) into a 
coordination game (Figure 1).2 
 
 Left Right 
Left 2, 2 0, 3 
Right 3, 0 1, 1 
 
 Left Right 
Left 2, 2 0, 0 
Right 0, 0 1, 1 
 
 
Figure 1: Transforming a Prisoner’s Dilemma game into a Coordination game. 
 
The transformation of (3, 0) and (0, 3) into (0, 0) may take place in different ways. If the 
payoffs represent utility values, as it is often the case in standard game theory, then the 
reduction of the “free-riding” payoffs (Right-Left and Left-Right) may be due to a feeling 
of guilt or shame: the other player had trusted my cooperation and I have let her down, 
for example. But in many societies there are external mechanisms that reduce our payoffs 
both at the psychological and at the material level: a verbal reproach or ostracism from 
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business are examples of how normative pressure helps attaining socially superior 
equilibria in the game of life. 
  
Roughly, then, a social norm exists when every individual (1) prefers to conform to the 
norm provided that (almost) everybody else does the same; (2) it is common knowledge 
that one ought to conform; and (3) this normative expectation is backed up by sanctions.3 
Lewis somewhat misleadingly claims that “conventions are a species of norms”. But 
Lewis Conventions are not norms in the sense specified by conditions (1)-(3). Rather, 
conventions are supported by extrinsic normative considerations: one follows a 
convention because (a) it is individually rational to do so, and (b) deviance from 
conventions is usually sanctioned by other independent social norms. A convention does 
not, per se, imply a commitment to conformity to the same strategy. While satisfying (1) 
and (2), condition (3) does not apply. The sanctions that support a convention are not 
tailored to supporting that particular strategy, but derive from considerations of a much 
more general kind. 
 
The key paragraph from Lewis (1969) is worth quoting in full: 
 
we do presume, other things being equal, that one ought to do what answers to his 
own preferences. And we presume, other things being equal, that one ought to do 
what answers to others’ preferences, especially when they may reasonably expect 
one to do so. For any action conforming to any convention, then, we would 
recognize these two (probable and presumptive) reasons why it ought to be done. 
We would not, so far as I can tell, recognize any similarly general reasons why it 
ought not to be done. This is what I mean by calling conventions a species of 
norms. (p. 98) 
 
Notice that Lewis’ expectations are “plain” expectations, to use Margaret Gilbert’s 
(1989) expression, i.e. non-normative expectations about what others will do (as rational 
individuals), rather than what they ought to do. Lewis does not explain why one should 
answer to others’ preferences in such situations. He only says that not doing so is likely 
to cause feelings of disapproval, and even to trigger sanctions (pp. 99-100). So we should 
imagine that breaking conventions would amount to violating some independent norm, 
like “do not harm others unless there is a good reason to do so” (Gilbert 1989, p. 354). 
Although “‘convention’ itself, on my analysis, is not a normative term”, says Lewis, 
“there are certain probable consequences implied by the fact that an action would 
conform to a convention [...] which are presumptive reasons, according to our common 
opinion, why that action ought to be done” (1969, p. 97, emphasis added). 
 
Lewis’ analysis is controversial. Margaret Gilbert (1989, 2008) has argued forcefully that 
conventions, norms, and related social institutions (customs, traditions, rules) must be 
analysed in terms of more primitive notions of group action and collective intention. In 
particular, conventions result from a “quasi-agreement” among members of a group to 
pursue a certain line of action that will attain a specific collective goal. Such quasi-
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agreements need not be formulated explicitly, and often derive from the mere observation 
that people do pursue a certain line of action that serves the goals of the relevant group. 
Collective intentions result in a joint commitment that cannot be unilaterally breached by 
an individual group member. This is why, according to Gilbert, we usually feel the need 
to excuse and justify a breach of convention in front of other group members. One of 
Gilbert’s complaints is that “conventions in Lewis’ sense do not seem apt to give rise to 
the ‘ought’ judgments typically associated with conventions as ordinarily conceived” 
(1989, p. 354). 
 
Theories of group action are sophisticated and are becoming increasingly influential, but 
this is not the place to examine them in detail.4 Lewis’ approach conflicts with these 
accounts in a number of ways. Gilbert even disputes that coordination games provide a 
good starting point for a philosophical analysis of convention. In what follows I will 
bracket such issues and focus on the main disagreement concerning normativity.5 Even if 
coordination games did not provide necessary conditions for social conventions, they 
would still model a number of situations that we commonly associate with conventions. 
These “Lewis Conventions” – a technical term from now on – are the focus of this paper. 
But are there any Lewis Conventions, after all? 
 
Analysis and intuitions 
 
It is not clear how this question should be tackled. Lewis has been commonly read as 
providing an analysis of the vernacular notion of convention. Accordingly, critics like 
Gilbert have focused on counterexamples that exploit inconsistencies between his theory 
and the everyday conceptual apparatus associated with convention. Luckily, she claims, 
“we can tell much that we need to know about concepts by telling science fiction tales 
and such” (Gilbert 1989, p. 10). Here’s one such tale: 
 
People in a certain community regularly take tea at four in the afternoon. Though 
this is population common knowledge no one affects a particular positive attitude 
towards the practice, beyond generally conforming to it. In particular, it is not 
regarded as mandatory in any way. When Sally suggests to Charles that he come for 
tea at five, Charles may be a little surprised but has no sense of impropriety. If this 
is the way things are I suggest that we would not say that they have a convention 
that four o’clock is the time to have tea. (Gilbert 1989, p. 350) 
 
Let us take Gilbert’s suggestion seriously: would we say that there is a convention to 
have tea at four, or not? It is hard to say. Linguistic practices do not constrain the usage 
of terms like “convention” enough for there being a definite answer to this question.6 
                                                 
4
 See Gold and Sugden (2007) for a critical analysis and overview. 
5
 Notice that other philosophers do not associate the notion of collective intentions strictly with the idea of 
joint commitment. Searle (1990) and Bratman (1993), for example, have proposed non-normative theories 
of collective intentionality. Sugden’s (2000) and Bacharach’s (2006) theories of “team reasoning” also 
reject Gilbert’s notion of commitment and restrict normativity to the “ought” of logical inference. 
6
 Concerns of this kind are not new and are not peculiar to the philosophy of social science. They have 
emerged first in epistemology (see e.g. Stich 1990) and ethics (Horowitz 1998). For general surveys of 
 6 
Philosophers’ tales often stretch our intuitive capacities to the breaking point (as in the 
quoted paragraph) where clear intuitions are hard to come by. 
 
Of course this conceptual gymnastic is far from uninteresting. In telling us what a 
convention really is Gilbert constructs a complex conceptual structure that is bound to be 
partly revisionary of the way in which we use our language. The logical positivists 
pointed out a long time ago that philosophical analysis can (and perhaps ought to) have a 
critical as well as a descriptive function.7 But then agreement with our linguistic practice 
or with our intuitions in highly fictional scenarios cannot be the ultimate test of validity 
for philosophical reconstructions of folk concepts.8 
 
Indeed, it may be more important to come up with a new, coherent concept of convention 
than trying to mirror a muddled discourse. In a recent contribution to social ontology 
Raimo Tuomela (2002) for instance declares to be interested in analyzing the “common-
sense framework of [collective] agency”. This framework is presented as the carrier of a 
great amount of useful information about social reality, and as an important testing device 
for philosophical constructs. However, he admits that ultimately the common-sense 
framework is likely to be incoherent. Only by revising it we can construct a coherent 
system that may help future social scientists: 
 
the resulting account [of social reality] does not really compete with what social 
scientists are doing as it rather is meant in part to critically analyze the 
presuppositions of current scientific research and [...] to provide a new conceptual 
system for theory-building (Tuomela 2002, p. 7) 
 
Scientific theories, I take, must then be tested in the usual way. Ontological investigation 
can play a heuristic role, but is eventually appraised on the basis of the science it has 




There are reasons to believe that Lewis himself would not disagree. Lewis (1969) says 
repeatedly that he is providing an analysis of convention. What he does not claim, 
however, is that he is primarily interested in providing an analysis of our folk notion of 
convention. While expressing the hope that it captures the vernacular concept of 
convention, Lewis is adamant that agreement with such a concept is neither the only nor 
the most important criterion for the appraisal of his theory:  
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I hope it is an analysis of our common, established concept of convention […]. 
But perhaps it is not, for perhaps not all of us do share any one clear general 
concept of convention. At least, insofar as I had a concept of convention before I 
thought twice, this is either it or its legitimate heir. And what I call convention is 
an important phenomenon under any name (Lewis 1969, p. 3; see also p. 46 for a 
reiteration of this point). 
 
The analysis of folk theories of course plays an important role in Lewis’ philosophy in 
general. One of Lewis’ lasting contributions consists precisely in clarifying a method of 
philosophical analysis (the “Carnap-Ramsey-Lewis” method) that is applicable to a wide 
range of folk theories – from psychology, to mathematics, colours and even holes. So 
readers may have been misled into thinking that the project pursued in Convention is 
analogous to the analyses that Lewis provides elsewhere. But this is doubtful, and the 
best way of seeing this is by trying to place the theory of conventions in the context of 
Lewis’ method. 
 
In “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications” Lewis (1972) gives a detailed 
account of the method of analysis of folk theories. The analysis proceeds in four steps. 
First, collect all the “platitudes” of the folk theory in question. In the case of psychology, 
for example, the platitudes are going to be everyday principles like “if people want an 
object, believe that the object is within their reach, and no counteracting reason 
intervenes, then they try to grab that object”, and other trivialities of this sort. 
 
Second, form the conjunction of these platitudes.9 This conjunction will include both 
problematic, “Theoretical” terms (mental states, for example), and unproblematic “Old” 
terms referring to familiar objects and phenomena (facial expressions, linguistic 
utterances, etc.). Following Carnap, Lewis proposes that the meanings of the T-terms be 
defined by their functional role in the folk theory – their relations with one another and 
with the O-terms of the theory. (For this reason, Lewis calls the conjunction of platitudes 
“the postulate of the term-introducing theory”.) 
 
All the T-terms can now be replaced with variables, and these variables can be quantified 
over to obtain claims of the form: “There are X, Y, Z,… that stand in such-and-such 
relations among themselves and with the O-terms”. This quantified version of the 
conjunction of platitudes is the “Ramsey-sentence” of the folk theory. By “Ramseyfing” 
we explicate the role of problematic T-terms, simply by showing what their job is in the 
overall economy of the folk theory. Although the Carnap-Ramsey-Lewis approach has 
been widely debated, these three preliminary steps are meant to capture the core activities 
that most philosophers associate with the method of conceptual analysis. “Collecting the 
platitudes” actually gives a false appearance of simplicity to what is typically a difficult, 
controversial task. Counterexamples and “fiction tales” play a prominent role in deciding 
which platitudes are to be included among the postulates, and the definition of the folk 
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theory is achieved by a difficult balancing act between general principles and intuitions 
about specific cases.10 
 
Frank Jackson (1998) has argued that conceptual analysis is instrumental to the goals of 
“serious metaphysics”. The Ramseyfication of a folk theory, in other words, should not 
be pursued as an end in itself. Serious metaphysics must bring order and simplicity in the 
heterogeneous list of what there is – the list of entities and properties that figure in our 
folk theories. The fourth step in the Carnap-Ramsey-Lewis method in fact is concerned 
with reduction, whereby problematic T-terms are shown to be co-referential with the less 
problematic terms of a base theory. In many cases – like the mind-body problem that 
concerns Lewis (1970, 1972) – the reduction is potential rather than actual. We do not 
know yet what the T-terms of folk psychology refer to, although presumably future 
neuroscience will let us know. In the meantime we can still say something general about 
the denotation of the folk concepts, by explicating the causal roles that brain states will 
have to account for, in order to attain the reduction of mental states. 
 
Successful completion of this four-step process hinges crucially on the strength of the 
analysandum, that is, on the correctness of the folk theory in question. In the case of 
psychology we seem to have a decisive advantage, for we have direct access to the folk 
theory in question. Lewis goes as far as to saying that the principles of folk psychology 
are common knowledge (albeit of the tacit kind) and therefore only require to be made 
explicit for all members of the folk to recognize their validity. This advantage can be 
used to pull out a simple trick. Consider that the Ramsey-sentence implies the theory: if 
X, Y, Z exist then the theory is true. The latter implication (or “Carnap-sentence”: RT ⊃ 
T) is analytic in Lewis’ view. Lewis introduces a “modified Carnap sentence” to ensure 
uniqueness: on pain of indeterminacy of reference, the theory must refer to one set of 
entities only. And here comes the trick: if the modified Carnap-sentence is analytic, then 
obviously either the T-terms do not refer, or our platitudes about them are true. But if the 
folk theory has been analyzed properly, then the platitudes are true (they are platitudes 
after all!). So the T-terms do refer (although we may not know exactly what they refer 
to). 
 
Lewis uses this trick explicitly in his work on the mind-body problem. The T-terms are 
names of mental states, and the O-terms name sensory stimuli, motor responses, and the 
like. Once our folk-psychology has been Ramseyfied, we know what sort of job the 
entities that will replace mental states in our future base theory must do – even though we 
do not know exactly what these entities are. Lewis follows more or less the same strategy 
in his work on colours and the foundations of mathematics,11 but the case of conventions 
is more complicated. Unlike folk psychology, vernacular social ontology is hardly 
common knowledge among the folk. On the contrary, if social psychologists are right we 
should expect it to be deeply mistaken on a number of issues, and in a systematic way 
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too.12 With such a problematic analysandum, the Carnap-Ramsey-Lewis project cannot 
even take off. 
 
And in fact there is an important disanalogy between Lewis’ approach in Convention and 
his method of analysis of folk theories. The key T-term (“Lewis Convention”, as we shall 
call it) is defined by Lewis using a scientific model rather than a set of folk platitudes. 
The model is partly borrowed from the theory of games, and is partly of Lewis’ own 
invention. There is no doubt that Lewis believes that many platitudes can be captured by 
his theory – and yet the platitudes do not constitute the theory itself. 
 
There are, to sum up, two possible interpretations of Lewis’ project. On one reading, he is 
indeed attempting an analysis of our folk notion of convention. He is concerned with the 
first three steps of the Carnap-Ramsey-Lewis method, in other words. And yet, consider 
the O-terms: far from relying on unproblematic notions, Lewis analyzes convention using 
sophisticated concepts such as utility maximization, Nash equilibrium, and common 
knowledge. Once this has been done, the Ramseyfication of Lewis’ theory of conventions 
will not deliver the trick. According to the analytic (modified) Carnap-sentence, either 
Lewis Conventions do not exist, or the theory is true. But since the theory is not just a 
conjunction of platitudes, it may well be false. Lewis Conventions may not exist after all. 
 
On another reading, Lewis is proposing a scientific theory that may (or may not) provide 
the base for the reduction of “folk” conventions. He is concerned with the last step 
(reduction) of the Carnap-Ramsey-Lewis method, in other words. Of course we cannot 
guarantee that a scientific theory is able to capture all the features of folk conventions. 
We may have to be eliminativist regarding at least some of the latter. But this may not 
matter if, as Lewis says, “what I call convention is an important phenomenon under any 
name” (1969, p. 3). 
 
Under the first reading, Lewis can be criticized for doing an imperfect analysis of the folk 
notion of convention. His theory does not fit our core intuitions. This is Gilbert’s 
interpretation, and should be dismissed in my view.13 According to the second 
interpretation, the question of the correctness of Lewis’ theory is a scientific one. 
Consider an analogy with physics: the reduction of thermodynamics to molecular physics 
is predicated on the fact that the latter gets most things right, at its own level of analysis. 
The discovery that the motion of particles can do (almost all) the job of temperature is 
exciting precisely because the laws governing this motion are secure on experimental 
grounds. Similarly, the reduction of mental states to brain states will occur only when the 
principles of neurophysiology will be properly understood and validated. Has this 
prerequisite been satisfied in the case of conventions? If Lewis’ theory were not 
confirmed by empirical data, then it would not even be a contender for metaphysical 
reduction. If the theory did not describe the phenomena adequately at its own level of 
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analysis, then the issue of whether we have good intuitions about, say, normativity, 
would not even arise. We wouldn’t have to choose between a scientific and a folk theory, 
if the scientific theory was imperfect or even plainly false. That’s why, according to this 
reading, Lewis’ theory must be assessed in the laboratory, rather than in the philosopher’s 
armchair. 
 
Back to the lab 
 
We have seen that coordination is achieved quite easily in small groups playing 
repeatedly the game in Table 1. But this does not mean that Lewis was right. Lewis 
Conventions involve a particular set of mechanisms that facilitate and support 
coordination, and the mere observation that coordination takes place sheds little light on 
the underlying mechanisms. Are experimental subjects driven by the motives highlighted 
by Lewis, or is there a more complicated story to be told? In particular, was Lewis right 
on normativity? Do instrumental rationality and external norms provide an exhaustive 
account of the “ought” of convention, or is there an intrinsic normative pressure to 
conform? 
 
We can answer these questions by manipulating the incentives of the game. Suppose that 
after nine rounds of “normal” coordination play, the tenth and final round includes a 
surprise: instead of the incentive structure of Table 1, players will face the payoffs in 
Table 2. Whatever convention evolved in the early stages of the game (Red-Red or Blue-
Blue), one player (we shall call her the “potential deviant”) has an incentive to deviate 
from it. In Table 2 the potential deviant is the row player, and as usual the other two 
members of the group are jointly represented as column. The key feature is that by 
breaching the convention a deviant imposes a penalty on the other group members. 
 
 
 Red Blue 
Red 200, 200 300, 0 
Blue 300, 0 200, 200 
 
Table 2: Incentive to deviate in the 10th round 
 
Before the tenth round the potential deviant is informed about this change in the payoff 
structure, but the other two group members are not. She is told that they are not aware of 
this change, but that at the end of the game they will be fully informed about the payoff 
structure and the choice of the potential deviant. So before the tenth round the potential 
deviant can safely assume that the two other players will continue to follow the 
convention. As a potential deviant, your choice-situation is very simple: either conform 
(everybody earns 200) or breach the convention (you earn 300, they earn nothing). 
 
We can now detect the effect of norms by observing whether potential deviants are 
willing to forego individual earnings and conform to the convention that evolved in 
earlier rounds. The normativity of convention is the (normative) expectation that you 
ought to bear the possible costs of non-deviance, because I am planning my choices 
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based on the expectation that you will conform. Normativity is manifested in the decision 
to “leave some money on the table” and privilege the group’s earnings with respect to 
one’s own private gain.14 
 
Our tenth round can then be used as an “acid test” to detect the influence of normative 
forces that may have emerged during the early rounds of group play. As a matter of fact 
in the laboratory less than one-third (30%) of the potential deviants decide to breach the 
convention. This may sound remarkably low, but in fact is consistent with a large body of 
experimental data.15 So why do people decide to conform? Notice that the incentive 
structure of the tenth round is similar to a sequential game in which the first mover does 
not have any other option except to put herself in the hands of the potential deviant. After 
the tenth round the game is over and the three players will never meet again. So a purely 
consequentialist, looking-forward agent will not be afraid of disrupting the convention 
that has emerged in the previous rounds. 
 
If strategic considerations cannot play a role here, the remarkably high level of 
conformity with the convention can be explained by the existence of social norms that 
prescribe cooperation. A norm of altruism (“you ought to help the members of your 
group”) for example may prescribe to conform to the established regularity. If it is 
common knowledge in the group that the norm applies to situations of this kind, the 
potential deviant may be willing to comply with the norm at the expense of some 
individualistic gain. Similarly, norms of fairness or equality will prescribe to conform to 
the behaviour of other group members because this is the way to achieve an equal 
distribution of the resources.16 
 
We know that these norms are at work, because we can manipulate them. By changing 
the payoffs in the last round it is possible to trigger (or shield) different norms that dictate 
cooperation. Consider the payoffs in Table 3. In the tenth round now the potential deviant 
faces a straight choice between earning 300 at others’ expenses, and letting them earn 
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assumption of self-interest that is commonly included in economic models. It is sometimes pointed out that 
game theory does not, strictly speaking, predict that individuals maximize their expected monetary payoffs. 
The theory says that individuals act so as to maximize their expected utility, and the latter does not have to 
be an increasing function of their monetary gains only. Utility, however, is not directly observable. By 
observing deviations from the prediction of the standard model we can try to reconstruct utility functions 
using behavioural evidence. This strategy is potentially fruitful, and has led to the creation of increasingly 
sophisticated models incorporating normative considerations of altruism, fairness, equality, and reciprocity. 
Philosophical and methodological discussion of these issues can be found in Bicchieri (2006), Guala 
(2006), and Woodward (forthcoming). 
15
 See Guala and Mittone (2008) for a more detailed discussion of the experimental results, as well as 
footnote 16 below. 
16
 The same behaviour can be captured by postulating other-regarding preferences. Although models of 
other-regarding preferences are popular among economists in virtue of their simplicity and tractability, they 
are known to have a number of defects. I will not pursue this distinction here, but a thorough discussion of 
the difference between theories of social norms and theories of other-regarding preferences can be found in 
Bicchieri (2006, Ch. 3). 
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200 at her own expense. Instead of a choosing between an individualistic and a 
cooperative outcome, as in Table 2, she now chooses among an altruistic and an 
individualistic outcome. Unsurprisingly, the proportion of deviants is much higher in this 
condition. 65% of players now choose a different colour and take the 300 tokens. This is 
to be expected if, as plausible, only a minority of altruists is willing to donate money at 




 Red Blue 
Red 0, 200 300, 0 
Blue 300, 0 0, 200 
 
Table 3: Altruistic vs. individualistic option 
 
The design so far does not allow one to discriminate between “external” norms of 
cooperation and the “intrinsic” normative force of convention. When the potential deviant 
approaches the tenth round, she may be influenced by the history of play that has 
developed in her own group. Repeated team play over the first nine rounds may have 
generated an extra pressure to conform, over and above the considerations listed above. 
Perhaps, as suggested by Gilbert, this pressure is the consequence of a joint commitment 
associated with collective intentionality. In any case, the mere fact that some subjects are 
willing to conform to the convention and forego individual gains merely tells us that there 
is some norm at work, but does not indicate exactly what kind of normativity we are 
dealing with. 
 
If the intrinsic normativity of convention emerges via repeated group play, we should be 
able to observe the net effect of external norms prescribing cooperation simply by 
eliminating group play. We can subtract the intrinsic force of convention, and leave only 
the effect of external norms. This is what happens in the one-shot game represented in 
Figure 2. 
 





Figure 2: The one-shot game. 
 
The decision tree represents the game as seen from the viewpoint of the potential deviant 
(“Player 3”). The first two players do not move – their colour is arbitrarily assigned by a 
computer. The potential deviant can observe the result, and then decide whether to play 
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the same colour or not. Notice that at this point she is facing exactly the decision situation 
of the tenth round of the repeated game, except that there is no history of group play, and 
thus no opportunity for the intrinsic normativity of convention to emerge. Whatever 
expectations are formed regarding the potential deviant’s behaviour, they must arise from 
external social norms prescribing cooperation in situations of this kind.  
 
When the one-shot sequential game is played in the laboratory, 68% of the experimental 
subjects decide to deviate, compared to 30% in the repeated game.17 The mere fact of 
playing together for nine rounds is sufficient to enhance conventional behaviour. 
Conventions are not only sustained by external norms of cooperation, but also by an 
intrinsic normative pressure to conform to an established regularity. 
 
Are there Lewis Conventions? 
 
A Lewis Convention solves a coordination problem by acting as a focal point that guides 
our choices in future play. In Lewis’ model each player follows the convention for two 
sets of reasons: to pursue her own selfish gain; and because external social norms dictate 
not to hurt others, ceteris paribus. Both reasons motivate the behaviour of real players 
facing simple choices in laboratory settings. But a third factor also influences real 
decision-makers. When a group of players build a history of joint action, they 
unintendedly create an additional pressure towards conformity that goes beyond the 
“ought” of individual rationality and the “ought” of external social norms. Whether this 
intrinsic normativity is to be explained by a joint commitment or some other mechanism 
is an important question that we do not know how to answer yet. More data must be 
collected to disentangle the complex causal processes underlying the dynamics of group 
play. For the time being, we can say that Lewis’ model overlooks these processes and 
provides only a partial account of the ontology of conventions. 
 
The experiments were designed to deliver a particularly powerful message. In real life, 
admittedly, we do not always interact anonymously with a group of strangers whom we 
are unlikely ever to meet again. But consider that our anodyne experimental settings are 
much less likely to create social pressure on the participants, than the sort of situations we 
face in everyday life. And yet, the intrinsic normativity of conventions can be observed 
even in these unfavourable conditions. We can only expect the pressure to increase when 
we play indefinitely repeated games with our family members, friends, and colleagues. 
                                                 
17
 This replicates what we already know from similar experiments. Charness and Rabin (2002) for instance 
have found remarkably similar results in a two-player sequential game where the first mover chooses 
between opting out and staying in the game. If she opts out, she will earn nothing and the first mover will 
earn 800 tokens; if she stays in, the second mover has a choice between taking all the money (0, 800) or 
sharing in equal parts (400, 400). In their sample, no first mover opts out, 56% of the second movers 
choose the “fair” outcome, and 44% choose the inequitable one. The importance of history is apparent also 
in Charness and Rabin’s game. In another condition experimental subjects are offered a straight choice 
between the two allocations, (0, 800) and (400, 400). Technically, this is a mini-version of a so-called 
Dictator’s game, where the other player (the equivalent of the “first mover”, in the sequential game) is not 
allowed to make any decision whatsoever. In the Mini-dictator’s game players opt in majority for the 
inequitable division (78%). So the mere fact that the first movers are allowed to do something and choose 




Thus “Lewis Convention”, as a theoretical term, strictly speaking does not refer. To 
conclude that “folk” conventions do not exist would have a whiff of absurdity – surely 
we cannot question their existence, for we deal with conventions all the time. That’s why 
some philosophers, contemplating the prospect that Lewis Conventions may not exist, 
suggest that they were a bad idea right from the start. Since Lewis did not capture the 
everyday notion of convention, surely we should let his theory rest in peace? This would 
be too hasty. If Lewis was not analyzing a folk theory, his theory should not be appraised 
with criteria that are appropriate to the analysis of folk theories. The relevant criteria are 
scientific, and Lewis’ theory should be assessed in the light of these only. Intuitions do 
play a role in the test of social scientific theories, but they are not the evidence against 
which such theories are tested. They rather work as heuristic devices, suggesting 
mechanisms and hypothesis which must then be investigated empirically. 
 
One final point is worth making: I have said that Lewis’ theory is false, strictly speaking. 
But “strictly speaking” is too strict: all scientific theories are false to some extent, as far 
as we know. If literal truth was our criterion of appraisal, then no theoretical terms would 
refer, even in the most advanced sciences. There would be no quarks, electrons, atoms, 
chemical elements, molecules, cells, organisms, and so on and so forth. This seems to 
result in too much waste: the physical, chemical, and biological theories used to define 
these concepts are too important and successful to make referential success hostage to 
literal truth. Lewis (1970) calls the entities named by the T-terms of a theory the 
“realizers” of T. If there are no exact realizers of any important scientific theory, then we 
should only require that a theory is nearly realized by a set of entities, in order for its T-
terms to refer. Or, at any rate, that it is more nearly realized than its rivals. Lewis’ theory 
has some rivals, and some rival accounts (like Gilbert’s)18 seem to capture some details 
of the story that are overlooked by Lewis.  
 
It is still early days, of course, and we should suspend judgment until more data have 
been gathered to test these alternatives. Even then, some difficult choices will lie ahead: 
to specify a metric of realization is a notoriously difficult problem in the philosophy of 
science. An adequate metric may have to combine different criteria on various 
dimensions, in the skilful and ingenious ways that scientists master. Although we are still 
far from cracking all these problems, it would be foolish to abandon the task. What 
conventions are is a scientific, empirical question, and we should invest our energies into 
answering it in a proper, scientific way. Lewis’ theory gave us the conceptual framework 
and the methodological tools to pursue this project. It seems appropriate, then, to answer 
our question as follows:  
 
Are there Lewis Conventions?  




                                                 
18
 I use the term “account” to signal the fact that not all of them are as precisely and formally defined as 
Lewis’ own theory. 
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